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Article 6

The conference “On the Idea of
Communism” took place at Birkbeck College, in the University of
London, on 13–15 March 2009.
There were twelve speakers, and
nearly a thousand people in attendance. The conference, which was
Conference Review: “On the Idea
organized by Slavoj Žižek and Alain
of Communism,” Birkbeck
Badiou, was intended, as Žižek said
College, 13–15 March 2009
in his opening remarks, not to
engage in discussion of actual political programs, or to intervene in the
harsh realities of day-by-day social
and political struggles, but to consider how the philosophical idea,
or ideal, of communism might be
revitalized and made useful in the
twenty-first century. Žižek said that
the time for guilt over the crimes of
the twentieth century was over,
and that today we need to reclaim
the name of “communism” from
the ill repute into which it has
sunk. For my part, I think that this
impulse is altogether correct. Many
crimes were undoubtedly committed by Communist parties, or in the
name of communism, throughout
the twentieth century. But capitalism, too, is guilty of many crimes.
And where communism has been
thoroughly demonized, capitalism
still refuses to acknowledge its own
crimes or to show any repentance
for them. Given the increasingly
untenable situation in which we
live today, exacerbated by the current financial disaster, communism
may well be an idea whose time
has finally come.
Of course, part of the appeal of
events such as this conference is
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simply that they give us an opportunity to see academic superstars in
action. From this perspective, “On
the Idea of Communism” did not
disappoint. Slavoj Žižek was in fine
form, manic and excited, and so
full of a kind of outward-directed
energy that I didn’t really mind his
overbearingness. Gianni Vattimo,
whom I had never seen before (and
of whose works I have read only a
little) was quite a charmer, in a
humorously self-deprecating way.
Terry Eagleton reveled in the role
of the lone British commonsense
empiricist in a room otherwise full
of Continental dialecticians. Antonio Negri was warm and animated,
while Jacques Rancière was admirably meditative. Alain Badiou
served as a sort of éminence grise,
dominating the proceedings as a
central reference point even when
he wasn’t on stage.
The main question that the conference raised for me was not “What
is communism?” nor even “How
can theory be tied to practice?” but
rather “What does it mean to explore the mere idea of communism,
as opposed to the actuality of capitalism?” The idea of communism
is to a large extent a negative one in
that we don’t really know what a
communist society would be like;
we can only say that it would mean
the emancipation of people, and
the establishment of forms of life
that are repressed, oppressed, and
denied an opportunity to flourish
today. Terry Eagleton’s talk was the
only one that endeavored to give

anything like a positive sense of
what communism might be like,
that tried to imagine it as an actual
state of being rather than just as
the negation of what we have
today. For Eagleton, communism
means abundance and leisure; it is
much closer to the life of aristocrats
(or, rather, to our imagination of
aristocrats’ lives) than it is to anything like the oppressive actuality
of working-class experience. He
explained this sense of actual communism by quoting copiously from
Shakespeare and other great canonical authors. The unintended
effect of this “blast from the past”
was to suggest, in a symptomatic
way, the limitations of any attempts
to imagine utopia. It didn’t really
convince. I appreciated Eagleton’s
citations of The Tempest in the same
way that I appreciated other speakers’ invocations of Plato and Hegel,
but, all in all, Eagleton seemed to
me to be a bit too vague and too
fussily “literary,” in an old-fashioned
way; he spoke a bit too much as
though it were still the “good old
days,” when horrible things like
movies and TV and the Internet
didn’t yet exist.
Eagleton’s talk, together with
the complete lack of speculation as
to what communism might actually entail by the other speakers,
left me convinced that “the idea of
communism”—or what Alain Badiou, both in his own talk and in
writings cited by others at the
conference calls “the communist
hypothesis”—is a utopian ideal, even
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in the old-fashioned sense of the
nineteenth-century “utopian socialism” that Marx rejected and mocked.
At the very least, “communism” is
the name for the only sort of utopianism available today that does
not involve any religious or New
Age ideas of perfectibility, redemption, and salvation. For communism is rather something much
more down to earth. Communism
has to do, pragmatically as well as
etymologically, with a sense of “the
common,” as Michael Hardt argued in his impressive talk on the
first day of the conference. In
Hardt’s view, the “common” is opposed both to private property and
to the state property of twentiethcentury “actually existing socialism.”
The common is neither “public” nor
“private,” but rejects both sides of
this binary opposition. The common rather has to do with the fact
that individual creativity is itself
possible only in the context of all
the linguistic, cultural, scientific,
and technological heritage of humankind. As Newton famously
said, he was only able to see further
than others because he stood on the
shoulders of giants. Today, more
and more of our common heritage
is being privatized, copyrighted,
and patented by multinational corporations. Political struggle must
involve taking back what is common to all of us. From this perspective, communism doesn’t mean
giving up on our inner lives, but
creating an environment in which
such lives might flourish. And, in

this humane sense, the idea of
communism is not really a political notion, although politics is undoubtedly a large part of what
might be needed to get there.
Hardt’s discussion of communism and the common involved a
focus on political economy and on
the question of property. Hardt’s
frequent collaborator Antonio Negri had this emphasis, as well. But
one of the things that surprised me
the most overall about the conference was that so few of the other
speakers had anything to say about
what Marx called “the critique of
political economy”—or, for that
matter, about the current economic
crisis (whose menace is certainly
part of the reason that “the idea of
communism” has become thinkable again or that so many people
attended a conference like this).
Now, I suppose that part of the
reason for this avoidance of political economy is that the very point
of “the idea of communism” is to
imagine a society in which the current constraints of a capitalist political economy no longer apply. But
this isn’t much of an alibi when you
consider that so many of the talks
at the conference were, indeed, about
the political strategies that might
be used to get there from here.
For instance, Peter Hallward,
with his usual lucidity and philosophical precision, developed a
rather alarming call for Jacobin
rigor and discipline in the defense
of virtue. He expounded upon, explicated, and expanded Rousseau’s
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doctrine of the “general will.” However, Hallward failed to explain
why such a reversion to the eighteenth century might provide resolutions to the questions of political
organization that Marxists struggled with, and failed to resolve, for
much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He also failed to
consider how revolutionary organizations analogous to the Jacobin
clubs in 1790s France could arise in
the first place in the contemporary
world. Cut off from any pragmatic
application, Hallward’s invocation
of a politics of the will struck me as
little more than a fantasmatic return
to the bad old days of “party discipline” that any left-wing movement
today would better do without.
At the other extreme from
Hallward, a number of speakers—
most notably, Badiou and Judith
Balso—went on at great length
about the necessity of struggles
against the State; but they seemed
to do this with little sense of how
State apparatuses actually work to
support and reinforce capital and
finance. The dirty little secret of
neoliberalism is that the “free market” could not actually function if
the government were actually to
observe a policy of laissez-faire and
to leave “the market” alone. For it
is only by rigid State control over
things like the money supply, together with rigid enforcement of
“property” laws (based on the absurd
fiction that, say, the genetic makeup
of genetically modified crops somehow had the same inviolable status

as my personal effects in my bedroom), that the crazed financial
speculation of the last several decades could have happened in the
first place. It is disheartening to
hear people on the left denounce
the State in the very same terms
that the neoliberals hypocritically
and misleadingly do.
The problem I have with leftist
anti-State rhetoric was most usefully brought out by Bruno Bosteels,
who pointed out how distinctly
unhelpful such an attitude is when
we have a situation such as that in
Bolivia, where President Morales
is specifically using the power of
the State—as a result of his election
to office by a large majority—to
improve economic conditions for
the vast masses, even at the expense
of the wealthy and privileged. One
might add that, in Bolivia as recently in Thailand and several
other places, it is precisely the privileged bourgeoisie who have used
the tactics of anti-State “people
power,” with mass protests and civil
disobedience, to bring down democratically elected majority governments who threatened their
economically based privileges.
The problems that arise from an
avoidance of any “critique of political economy” were particularly
evident in the case of Alain Badiou’s talk. Not only did Badiou leave
out political economy from his descriptions of how the revolutionary
event might challenge the capitalist status quo; but also, when questioned on this score, he explicitly
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denounced any attention to political economy as being the sin of
“economism.” Badiou argued that
economics could only be part of
“the situation” that it is the business of a new “truth,” produced in
a revolutionary event and by fidelity to that event, to disrupt. Badiou
shows his Maoist pedigree in this
insistence on politics as the ultimate ruling instance. Instead of
engaging in the critique of political
economy, and seeing the political
as so intimately intertwined with
the economic as to make any separation of them impossible, Badiou
relegates economy, in a nearly
Gnostic sort of way, to the realm of
the irretrievably fallen. His notion
of a pure politics (and a pure philosophy) unsullied by any contact
with, or “contamination” by, the
economic, is really the mirror image of today’s neoclassical economics that imagines itself to be value
neutral and apolitical. What this
comes down to is that Badiou is a
Maoist without the Marxism—a
stance that I find rather terrifying.
At his best, Badiou is a kind of
neo-Kantian. This is an appellation that he would undoubtedly
reject, and one that most contemporary philosophers would find
damning, though I mean it as a
sort of praise. What I mean by Badiou’s neo-Kantianism is that his
whole notion of the transformative
event, and of the ethics of remaining loyal to the event, is something
like a late-modernist version of the
categorical imperative. The event

is singular and yet of absolutely
universal import—it commands
our obedience, regardless of our
merely personal, “pathological” inclinations. Badiou even defines the
event, and the way we are called to
be faithful to it, in entirely formalist
terms—we are commanded by the
very form of the event rather than
by anything having to do with its
specific content. This is an utterly
Kantian way of thinking—and, unlike so many Hegelian commentators, I find this empty formalism
to be a strength, rather than a
weakness, of Kantian ethics. But I
shudder when Badiou goes on to
denature this Kantian impersonal
universalism by turning it into a
Pauline or Leninist or Maoist form
of what Kant would have called fanaticism. Again, I am no Leninist
or Maoist to begin with, but to take
Leninism and Maoism and remove
the Marxism from them, as Badiou
does, really leaves us with nothing
but a delusional hyperevoluntionaryism and a romanticized reveling in the cleansing possibilities of
terror.
All in all, the conference showcased the two major strains of
European and North American
theoretical approaches to communism today. On the one hand, there
is the return to revolutionary fervor advocated by Žižek and Badiou. On the other hand, there is
Hardt and Negri’s vision of the
“multitude” as a force against “empire.” Žižek and Badiou insist upon
the need for a “radical voluntarism”
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to oppose the otherwise ubiquitous
reign of capital. Hardt and Negri,
to the contrary, see late capitalist
globalization as, in effect, already
creating the objective conditions
for communism. The difference
between these two visions echoes
the dispute, which ran through
all of twentieth-century Marxism,
between vanguardists who sought
for strategies to take power and
those who believed that the logic of
history would almost automatically lead from capitalism to socialism and then communism. In the
twenty-first century, this opposition has become so sterile that we
need somehow to get beyond it altogether. But this is something that
nobody at the conference was able
to offer.
In a conference so dominated by
European and North American
concerns, the rest of the world was
noticeable by its absence. All the
speakers were white Europeans
or North Americans; in addition,
eleven of the twelve speakers were
men. The audience was more gender balanced than the panels, but it
was also overwhelmingly white.
This narrowness was quite deplorable. Žižek is well known for his
criticism of what he sees as multicultural pieties in the AngloAmerican academy, but, in this
case, I would not allow him to get
away with the claim that worries
about the overwhelmingly white
and male composition of the panels
is just some irrelevant whining
about representation. Rather, the

composition of the conference bespeaks a parochialism that “we” in
the West have still only done a very
poor job of breaking away from.
Bruno Bosteels was the only one of
the twelve speakers who talked a bit
about contemporary Latin American (specifically Bolivian) experiences and theorizations of getting
beyond capitalism. The Chinese
Cultural Revolution was the explicit focus of Alessandro Russo’s
talk, and a number of other speakers referred to it. But, all in all, the
conference was far less internationalist than it ought to have been.
Žižek, speaking on the last day,
gave what I am sure he would be
happy for us to think of as a Hegelian synthesis of everything that
went on during the conference.
Unlike most of his colleagues, and
in what might be thought of as a
nod to Hardt and Negri, his analysis did include political economy.
He listed four threats or challenges
that we face today in our world of
capitalism gone mad, and three of
them, he acknowledged, fit under
the rubric of Hardt and Negri’s
notion of “affective” or “immaterial” production. These were (1) the
threat of environmental disaster;
(2) questions of so-called intellectual property, of copyright, patents,
etc., and of the privatization of the
common (understanding this in
the broadest sense, as Hardt argued); and (3) questions of bioengineering, genetics, and the ability
to manipulate our own genes and
thus change “human nature” on a
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biological and physiological level.
Žižek added to these another challenge, which he said underlay all
the others: (4) the question of inclusion and exclusion on a global
level—as reflected in border controls, nationalisms, and the question of immigration (the countries
of the North excluding people
from the Global South, except insofar as their hyperexploitation
was facilitated on the basis of admitting them with only a semilegal
or illegal status). This last concern
ties in with the whole question of
global slums, as recently raised by
Mike Davis. It also articulates the
demands of capital that lie behind
what Gilles Deleuze called the
control society. And, finally, it gives
a way of acknowledging the issues
raised by postcolonial theory without falling into the multiculturalism that Žižek is not altogether
without justification in criticizing.
Žižek argued that these questions
could be resolved, in an anticapitalist direction, only by maintaining principles of egalitarianism and
universalism. His example of this
was the Haitian Revolution as the
radicalization, or Hegelian completion, of the French Revolution.
The French tried to repress the Haitians, which means that the French
were not able to live up to their
own universalism—they wouldn’t
apply this to black people. But the
Haitians took the principles of the
French Revolution more seriously
than the French themselves did; they
demanded and won independence,

against the French, on the basis of
the very principles that the French
had first enunciated. This is Žižek’s
way of splitting the difference between his inherent Eurocentrism
and the fact that by his own principles of universality he needs to
get away from Eurocentrism. In
effect, he is privileging Europe on
the grounds that Europe invented
the very universalism that commands us to stop privileging Europe.
As so often, I remain highly dubious of how this kind of Hegelian
maneuver can be invoked any time
Žižek needs to get out of a tight spot.
It ends up being, to my mind, a little
too easy and self-congratulatory a
method of resolving the problem.
In any case, after laying all this
out, Žižek went on to talk about
some of the difficulties that we face
in trying to deal with these questions. He was emphatic in arguing
that the radicalness of communism
needs to be upheld against the sort
of reforms that—now that some
of the excesses of finance are being
at least slightly reined in—could
come under the name of socialism
(as in Newsweek’s recent assertion
that “we are all socialists now”).
Such socialist reforms (including the
nationalization of institutions like
banks, or the de facto ownership of
the majority of stock in troubled
financial corporations by the U.S.
government) would give an illusion of reform while really leaving
the massive inequalities (between
wealthy financiers and everyone
else, and even more between the
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citizens of Western nations and
the overwhelming majority everywhere else in the world) largely
untouched. I think that Žižek is
right about this—the current crisis
situation at least in principle makes
radical alternatives more thinkable
than they were during the Internet and real-estate bubbles—even
though the recuperative efforts of
Western governments today are almost entirely oriented toward keeping alive the sense that there is no
alternative, even as the system (neoliberal capitalism) to which there
is supposedly no alternative has collapsed and discredited itself.
In this light, Žižek talked of the
difficulty of making any transgressive or oppositional gestures today
because of the way that such
gestures almost immediately get
commodified and recuperated, and
because the very ideas of transgression and radical innovation have
themselves become capitalist resources, the mantras of every business school and every CEO. Žižek
even quoted Brian Massumi to this
effect, much to my surprise (since
Massumi, like Hardt and Negri,
is very much on the Deleuzian side,
rather than the Lacanian one, of
recent debates).
Awareness of these issues, I
think, prevents Žižek from articulating groundless fantasies of revolutionary agency in the way that
speakers like Hallward and Badiou
did. Yet the only solution Žižek
himself had to offer, in his talk, was
an appeal to Badiou’s transcendental

formulation of politics as fidelity
to an event of radical rupture and
of “communism” as the name of
this event or rupture. During his
talk, Žižek called several times for
a “radical voluntarism”—though,
when called on this formulation in
the Q&A, he backpedaled (at least
rhetorically) and said that all he
meant by such a term was that, unlike the old Marxists of the earlier
part of the past century, we could
no longer believe today that the
logic of history was on our side or
that we could trust to the objective
course of events to displace capitalism and create the necessary and sufficient conditions for communism.
I agree with Žižek on this—
indeed, my largest disagreement
with Hardt and Negri is precisely
that they seem to affirm a soft version of the inevitable-movementof-history or “objective conditions”
thesis—but I think that a term like
“radical voluntarism” works to insinuate a positive thesis—a sense of
“what is to be done?”—that simply
isn’t there. Which leaves us back in
our current condition: the demoralization of an impotent Left. I
have no solution for this dilemma—
and I don’t think Žižek and Badiou (or Hardt and Negri either)
have any more of a solution than I
have. The problem is that these
theorists are way too eager to adopt
the rhetoric of seeming as though
they do.
All this was symbolized, sadly,
at the very end of the conference.
As everyone was preparing to leave,
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Žižek asked us to all stand up and
sing the “Internationale.” Almost
nobody did—a few people in one
corner were singing it but couldn’t
be heard above the general hubbub.
In my case—and I suspect this held
for a large majority of the hundreds
of people in the auditorium—I
would have liked to sing the “Internationale,” but I couldn’t—because,
although I am vaguely familiar
with the melody, I do not know the
words.
—Wayne State University

